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Abstract
Granger-Geweke causality (GGC) is a powerful and popular method for identifying directed functional (‘causal’) connectivity
in neuroscience. In a recent paper, Stokes and Purdon (2017b) raise several concerns about its use. They make two primary
claims: (1) that GGC estimates may be severely biased or of high variance, and (2) that GGC fails to reveal the full structural/causal
mechanisms of a system. However, these claims rest, respectively, on an incomplete evaluation of the literature, and a misconception
about what GGC can be said to measure. Here we explain how existing approaches resolve the first issue, and discuss the frequently-
misunderstood distinction between functional and effective neural connectivity which underlies Stokes and Purdon’s second claim.
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Granger-Geweke causality (GGC) is a powerful analysis
method for inferring directed functional (‘causal’) connectivity
from time-series data, which has become increasingly popular
in a variety of neuroimaging contexts (Hesse et al., 2003; Roe-
broeck et al., 2005; Ding et al., 2006; Dhamala et al., 2008a;
Bressler and Seth, 2011; Valdes-Sosa et al., 2011; Barrett et al.,
2012; Seth et al., 2015). GGC operationalises a statistical, pre-
dictive notion of causality in which causes precede, and help
predict their effects. When implemented using autoregressive
modelling, GGC can be computed in both time and frequency
domains, in both bivariate and multivariate (conditional) for-
mulations. Despite its popularity and power, the use of GGC
in neuroscience and neuroimaging has remained controversial.
In a recent paper, Stokes and Purdon (2017b) raise two primary
concerns: (1) that GGC estimates may be severely biased or of
high variance, and (2) that GGC fails to reveal the full struc-
tural/causal mechanisms of a system. We explain why these
concerns are misplaced.
We note that Stokes and Purdon (2017a) have since re-
sponded to critiques of their claims by Barnett et al. (2017)1
and Faes et al. (2017). Here, we expand on the points made
in those articles [see also Dhamala et al. (2018)], and reply in
detail to Stokes and Purdon (2017a).
Regarding the first claim, Stokes and Purdon (2017b) de-
scribe how bias and variance in GGC estimation arise from
the use of separate, independent, full and reduced regressions.
While true, this problem has long been recognised (Chen et al.,
2006; Barnett and Seth, 2014), and has already been solved
by methods which derive GGC from a single full regression2.
These methods essentially extract reduced model parameters
1Barnett et al. (2017) is a preprint of an earlier version of the current article.
2But note that the “partition matrix” solution proposed by Chen et al. (2006)
is incorrect; see, e.g., Solo (2016).
from the full model via factorisation of the spectral density ma-
trix. Well-documented approaches include Wilson’s frequency-
domain algorithm (Wilson, 1972; Dhamala et al., 2008b, 2018),
Whittle’s time-domain algorithm (Whittle, 1963; Barnett and
Seth, 2014), and a state-space approach which devolves to so-
lution of a discrete-time algebraic Riccati equation (Lancaster
and Rodman, 1995; Barnett and Seth, 2015; Solo, 2016). Thus,
the source of bias and variance discussed in Stokes and Purdon
(2017b) has already been addressed and resolved by previously
published methods.
In their reply, Stokes and Purdon (2017a) acknowledge some
of this work by saying: “We also described the state space so-
lution to these problems in Dr. Stokes’ Ph.D. thesis [Stokes
(2015)] in January 2015, but felt it was important to first char-
acterize and describe the problem, before laying out a solution
to that problem.” It is however worth noting that, at that time,
the problem itself was already long acknowledged (Chen et al.,
2006) and, even prior to publication of the state-space method,
the distinct and equally effective methods of Dhamala et al.
(2008b) and Barnett and Seth (2014) were already in the public
domain.
To further illustrate the issue of bias and variance high-
lighted by Stokes and Purdon (2017a), and its resolution
by single-regression methods, in Fig. 1 we plot estimated
frequency-domain GGC for the 3-node vector-autoregressive
(VAR) model in Stokes and Purdon (2017b), Example 1, us-
ing the single-regression state-space method (Barnett and Seth,
2015; Solo, 2016); see also Faes et al. (2017), Figure 1 and
Dhamala et al. (2018), Fig. 1. We remark that identical re-
sults are obtained using the time-domain spectral factorisation
method of Barnett and Seth (2014), as implemented in the cur-
rent (v1.0, 2012) release of the associated MVGC Matlab c© soft-
ware package (Barnett and Seth, 2012). Our Fig. 1 may be
directly compared with Fig. 2 in Stokes and Purdon (2017b);
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we see clearly that all estimates are strictly non-negative, and
that exaggerated bias and variance associated with the dual-
regression approach are absent. Therefore, Stokes and Purdon
(2017b) are in error when they state that “Barnett and Seth [. . . ]
have proposed fitting the reduced model and using it to directly
compute the spectral components . . . ”. This is important to note
because our MVGC toolbox has been widely adopted within the
community, with > 3, 500 downloads and a significant number
of high-impact research publications using the method (e.g.,
Yellin et al., 2015; Bruneau et al., 2015; Place et al., 2016;
Schmitt et al., 2017; Wilber et al., 2017). Thus, we can reas-
sure users of the toolbox that problems of bias and variance as
described by Stokes and Purdon (2017b) do not apply.
Sample variance is, of course, still evident, as is bias due
to non-negativity of the GGC sample statistic (which may be
countered by standard surrogate data methods), but both re-
main well below their minimum values across all model or-
ders for the dual-regression case (as evidenced by Stokes and
Purdon, 2017b, Fig. 2). Fig. 2 further compares bias and vari-
ance of time-domain GGC for the example system for single
and dual regressions, at model order 3, across a wide-range of
time-series lengths. A single regression consistently leads to
substantially less bias and variance, except at high time-series
lengths, where there is a drop-off of bias and variance for both
methods.
Stokes and Purdon (2017b) do correctly identify a funda-
mental cause of the problem with dual-regression GGC estima-
tion: even if the full process is a finite-order autoregression, the
reduced process will generally not be finite-order autoregres-
sive; rather, it will be vector-autoregressive moving-average
(VARMA), or equivalently, a finite-order state-space process
(Hannan and Deistler, 2012) – which may be poorly modelled
as a finite-order VAR (Barnett and Seth, 2014). The problem
is in fact more pervasive than this: the full process itself may
have a strong moving-average (MA) component and be poorly-
modelled as a finite-order VAR. This is because common fea-
tures of neurophysiological data acquisition, sampling and pre-
processing procedures such as subsampling and other temporal
aggregation, filtering, measurement noise and sub-process ex-
traction will all, in general, induce an MA component (Barnett
and Seth, 2011; Seth et al., 2013; Solo, 2016). This is par-
ticularly pertinent to fMRI data, where the haemodynamic re-
sponse acts as a slow, MA filter. Fortunately, the state-space
and non-parametric approaches handle VARMA data parsimo-
niously, hence avoiding this problem.
The second claim of Stokes and Purdon (2017b) is that GGC
fails to reveal the full structural/causal mechanisms of a system.
In their reply to our previous commentary, Stokes and Purdon
(2017a) ask: “[Barnett et al. (2017)] emphasize that Granger
causality reflects a ‘directed information flow.’ But how does
one meaningfully interpret that information flow?” We address
that question via a brief recap of the history, definition and in-
terpretation of Granger causality. Wiener and Granger3, in their
original conception, considered a notion of causality which, in
3Granger explicitly attributes the original premise to Norbert Wiener
(Wiener, 1956).
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Figure 1: Granger-Geweke frequency-domain causalities estimated by the
single-regression state-space method (Barnett and Seth, 2015; Solo, 2016) for
the 3-node VAR model in Stokes and Purdon (2017b), (Example 1, cf. Fig. 2).
The true model order of 3 was used for the (single, full-model) VAR estimates.
Plots are based on 10, 000 time series realisations of 500 observations: red lines
plot the exact causality for the model and blue lines sample estimate medians.
The shaded areas indicate 90% central confidence intervals, while the green
lines plot representative sample estimates. The dashed horizontal lines indicate
critical thresholds over all frequencies [see Stokes and Purdon (2017b), Sup-
porting Information, S9] at 95% significance, derived from simulation of the
corresponding null model.
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Figure 2: Granger-Geweke time-domain causality bias (left column) and vari-
ance (right column) for estimation by the single-regression state-space method
(red lines) and dual-regression method (blue lines), plotted aganst time series
length, for the example 3-node VAR model in Stokes and Purdon (2017b). Bias
is measured as the difference between the sample median and true causality,
while variance is measured as the mean absolute deviation of the sample causal-
ity (we use non-parametric measures, as the GGC sample estimators are non-
negative, non-Gaussian, and potentially highly skewed). The true model order
of 3 was used for all VAR estimates. Plots are based on 10, 000 time series
realisations for each number of observations.
Granger’s words (Granger, 2004) comprises two components:
(1) The cause occurs before the effect, and (2) The cause con-
tains information about the effect that is unique, and is in no
other variable. Granger refined these premises to a statement
about dependencies between stochastic processes, essentially
as follows: given two jointly-distributed stochastic processes
Xt,Yt in the context of a “universe of information”Ut (exclud-
ing Xt and Yt) at each time stamp t, then Y does not Granger-
cause X at time t iff
P(Xt | X−t ,Y−t ,U−t ) = P(Xt | X−t ,U−t ) (1)
where P(·|·) denotes conditional distribution and superscript ‘-’
denotes history up to (but not including) time t. That is, the dis-
tribution of X at time t, contingent on the full historical informa-
tion set, is unchanged by exclusion of the history of Y . Granger
(1963, 1969, 1981) then went on to devise statistical tests for
the null hypothesis of non-causality. To do so, he considered
(1) for linear VAR processes. The parametric VAR operational-
isation was subsequently formalised by Geweke in two semi-
nal papers (Geweke, 1982, 1984), where he defines (Geweke-
)Granger causality as a log-likelihood ratio test statistic for the
null hypothesis of non-causality, written FY→X | U , and also in-
troduces a spectral decomposition of the statistic.
An explicit information-theoretic expression of Wiener-
Granger causality surfaced nearly two decades later in the guise
of transfer entropy (TE; Schreiber, 2000; Palusˇ et al., 2001), a
form of conditional mutual information (MI):
TY→X | U ≡ I(Xt :Y−t | X−t ,U−t ) (2)
where I(· : · | ·) denotes conditional MI. Noting that variables
A, B are independent conditional on variable C iff I(A : B |C) =
0, the connection with (1) is immediately clear: Y does not
Granger-cause X at time t iff TY→X | U vanishes at t. In this
sense, TE is arguably a “purer”—nonparametric—expression
of Wiener and Granger’s notion than the parametric GGC form.
Its interpretation as a metric for information transfer between
stochastic variables rests on the appealing intuition of informa-
tion as reduction of uncertainty. The precise quantitative rela-
tionship between GGC and TE was established by Barnett et al.
(2009) and Barnett and Bossomaier (2013) which demonstrate,
respectively, that if all stochastic processes are jointly Gaus-
sian then there is an exact equivalence between GGC and TE,
and that, more generally, if they are jointly Markovian (pos-
sibly nonlinear and/or non-Gaussian) then the corresponding
Granger-Geweke log-likelihood ratio statistic is asymptotically
equivalent to the TE. GGC and TE, in short, are parametric and
nonparametric cousins, which instantiate the same formal con-
cept4. Interpretation and intuition accordingly transfer between
the notions. The relationship between parametric GGC and
4We concur with Stokes and Purdon (2017a) that other related, but non-
equivalent, measures have been misleadingly conflated with Granger causality,
in particular the “directed transfer function” (DTF; Kaminski and Blinowska,
1991) and “partial directed coherence” (PDC; Baccala and Sameshima, 2001).
While these are valid (spectral) measures in their own right, they cannot be said
to explicitly reflect the Wiener-Granger notion of causality.
3
information-theoretic TE in fact closely mirrors that between
correlation and MI, which, again, are equivalent for jointly
Gaussian variables. Indeed, correlation statistics are widely
regarded as standard—and uncontentious—measures of (undi-
rected) functional connectivity.
Stokes and Purdon (2017b) note that GGC reflects a com-
bination of ‘transmitter’ and ‘channel’ dynamics, and is inde-
pendent of ‘receiver’ dynamics. Again, this independence has
been previously identified, as a direct consequence of the in-
variance of GGC under certain affine transformations (Barrett
et al., 2010; Barnett and Seth, 2011). But why should this inde-
pendence matter? They suggest that it runs “counter to intuitive
notions of causality intended to explain observed effects” since,
according to them, “neuroscientists seek to determine the mech-
anisms that produce ‘effects’ within a neural system or circuit
as a function of inputs or ‘causes’ observed at other locations”.
In fact, this view resonates more strongly with approaches such
as Dynamic Causal Modelling (DCM; Friston et al., 2003)—
usually characterised as effective connectivity—which attempt
to find the optimal mechanistic (circuit-level) description that
explains observed data. GGC, on the other hand, models statis-
tical dependencies among observed responses and is therefore
an example of (directed) functional connectivity (see Seth et al.,
2015; Friston et al., 2013, for in-depth comparison). Essen-
tially, the distinction is between making inferences about an un-
derlying physical causal mechanism (DCM; Valdes-Sosa et al.,
2011) and—as explained above—making inferences about di-
rected information flow (GGC; Barnett et al., 2009). DCM is
able to deliver evidence for circuit-level descriptions of neu-
ral mechanism from a limited repertoire of tightly-framed hy-
potheses, which must be independently motivated and validated
(Stephan et al., 2010); it is, in particular, unsuited to exploratory
analyses. GGC inference, on the other hand, is data-driven and
“data-agnostic” (it makes few assumptions about the genera-
tive process, beyond that it be reasonably parsimoniously mod-
elled as a linear stochastic system), and as such is well-suited
to exploratory analyses. It delivers an information-theoretic in-
terpretation of the neural process which is both amenable to
statistical inference, and which also stands as an effect size for
directed information flow between components of the system
(Barrett and Barnett, 2013). Our view is that both approaches
address valid questions of interest for neuroscientific analyses,
and indeed, that this is reflected in the burgeoning literature in
both effective and functional connectivity analysis.
Stokes and Purdon (2017a), in their reply, go on to say:
“While GG-causality is decipherable in reference to the se-
lected model and its component dynamics, it is not understand-
able without these details.” This statement appears to be based
on an (unfortunately common) misunderstanding. The VAR (or,
more recently, state-space) models that underlie the most com-
mon GGC inference methods fulfil an entirely different func-
tion from the circuit-level models that underpin, e.g., DCM.
They are, in a sense “generic” [this statement can be made more
precise; see, e.g., Geweke (1982)] and do not pretend to rep-
resent physical mechanism. In the sense of the (asymptotic)
equivalence with TE, GGC may be considered an approxima-
tion to the nonparametric TE, and the underlying VAR model
a mathematical construct to operationalise this approximation,
in the same way that the linear regression model underlying a
parametric correlation statistic might be deployed to approx-
imate the information-theoretic MI. Indeed, the power of the
information-theoretic approach is precisely that it furnishes in-
tuitive, model-free accounts of dynamical processes.
Concluding, the primary claims in Stokes and Purdon
(2017b) are invalid. Currently available implementations deal
appropriately with issues of bias and variance associated with
dual regression methods, and invariance to receiver dynam-
ics does not undermine GGC’s ability to characterise informa-
tion flow. Altogether, when used with appropriate care, GGC
represents a conceptually satisfying and statistically powerful
method for directed functional connectivity analysis in neu-
roscience and neuroimaging. However, a range of additional
challenges remain in further developing this useful technique.
These include issues of stationarity, linearity and exogenous in-
fluences, as noted by Stokes and Purdon (2017b), and in addi-
tion the influences of noise, sampling rates and temporal/spatial
aggregation engendered by neural data acquisition (Solo, 2016;
Barnett and Seth, 2017).
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